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Automation, Workload and Attention 
 
Every field has its luminaries.  In Human Factors (as in every other domain) there are 
people who have produced that ‘key’ text or ‘definitive work’, people who propose ideas 
and concepts that lead one to ask, “why didn’t I think of that?”  In Human Factors 
research one such person is Professor Donald Norman.  Many in the field of Vehicle 
Design may be familiar with this name, it is, after all, associated with a popular and 
 widely read book, ‘The Design of Everyday Things’(1990).  Professor Norman has also 
written on the ‘Problems of Automation’ (1990), ‘Emotional Design’ (2003), ‘The 
Invisible Computer’ (1999) and held high profile positions at Apple Computers (Vice 
President of their Advanced Technology Unit).  We have had the recent pleasure of 
exchanging ideas with him. 
 
The discussion began with a request for copies of our papers on automobile automation.  
We sent some of the papers via email and post and a stimulating conversation ensued.  
So, rather than offering this as a ‘scientific paper’, the conversations are presented, 
interspersed with the relevant section from the papers, to help orientate the reader to 
several key arguments in Human Factors and its relation to vehicle design. 
 
Research in our driving laboratory has largely been directed at understanding the effects 
of vehicle automation on driver performance, and more specifically, mental workload.  
The kinds of systems we have been looking at include Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC; a 
speed and headway keeping device) and Active Steering (AS; which keeps cars within 
their lanes).  As many before us have stated, we found that some levels of vehicle 
automation can lead to underload – which is just as bad for performance as overload.  But 
there remains controversy in the literature as to why underload is bad.  We explain it with 
Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (MART). 
 
EXTRACT FROM:  Young, M. S. & Stanton, N. A. (2002). Attention and 
automation: new perspectives on mental underload and performance.  Theoretical 
Issues in Ergonomics Science, 3(2), 365-375. 
Applied research on attention implicitly assumes that the size of resource pools is fixed. 
Capacity may change with long-term fluctuations in arousal, mood, or age (Kahneman 
1973, Hasher and Zacks 1979, Humphreys and Revelle 1984), but in most applied 
experiments on attention these factors are assumed to be stable within participants. 
Performance on primary or secondary tasks, therefore, simply depends on demand not 
exceeding some arbitrary maximum. There is a possibility, though, that this limit may 
change in the relatively short term, depending on task circumstances. This introduces the 
concept of malleable attentional resource pools. Evidence is accumulating that simply 
reducing demand is not necessarily a key to improving performance. It is proposed that 
resources may actually shrink to accommodate any demand reduction, in a converse of 
the ‘work expands to fill the time available’ tenet. This could explain the apparent 
degradation of attention and performance observed in low demand tasks. If the maximum 
capacity of an operator has been limited as a consequence of the task, it is not surprising 
that they cannot cope when a critical situation arises. MART, therefore, potentially 
explains why mental underload can lead to performance degradation, whilst remaining 
grounded in established theories of attention. 
 
Imagine someone driving a fully automated car. This is a situation which considerably 
reduces MWL. Assuming an attentional demand model of MWL (Liao and Moray 1993, 
Young and Stanton 2001), this translates to low demand on resources. Now, MART 
posits that the size of the relevant resource pool will temporarily diminish, as it is not 
required. This could result in poorer performance on any subsidiary tasks, or problems if 
the driver is suddenly faced with increased demand (e.g. if the automation fails). 
 
The idea that the level of task demands can influence cognitive processing has been 
hinted at in previous research. Buck et al. (1994) quoted the ‘par hypothesis’ to explain 
some of their results. This states that, as demands fluctuate, operators increase or 
decrease the amount of effort invested in a task to maintain performance at a set level. 
 This level represents an operator’s personal par for that task. There is some support for 
this notion. Liao and Moray (1993) found that participants invest more effort with higher 
time pressure, which may increase capacity.  Conversely, Desmond and Hoyes (1996) 
concluded that a decrease in performance at low levels of demand might be due to a 
failure to mobilize effort appropriately to match the task. MART reflects these attitudes, 
but is a little more parsimonious with respect to current knowledge. Being grounded in 
theories of attention, it does not have to appeal to extraneous concepts such as effort or 
motivation. 
 
MART is also consistent with other theories of performance, such as working memory. 
An inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance could be due to competing 
processes of attentional resources and working memory. It has already been argued that 
MWL does not necessarily correlate with arousal directly, but the malleable resources 
perspective suggests that MWL can have the same influence, by affecting attentional 
capacity. In that respect, the hypothesis is by no means radical or novel, but simply taking 
existing ideas from the basic literature and applying them in a new domain. 
 
A further implication concerns the traditional views of demand-performance 
relationships. Fixed capacity models assume that performance remains at ceiling, and is 
data-limited, as long as demands remain within the attentional capacity of the operator 
(Norman and Bobrow 1975, Stokes et al. 1990). Performance only begins to decline as 
the task demands approach the maximum resource availability. This is the very essence 
of the dual-task approach. Because two tasks can vary in objective difficulty, yet remain 
within the total capacity of the operator, overt performance differences will not be 
observed. A secondary task can assess remaining capacity once the primary task has 
taken its toll, and can, therefore, differentiate between such levels of difficulty. However, 
MART predicts that instead, performance is largely resource-limited for the full range of 
task demands. This would explain why some researchers (e.g. Roscoe 1992) have found 
an inverted-U relation between task demands and performance. At low levels of demand, 
attentional capacity is reduced, artificially limiting the performance ceiling. If task 
demands exceed the maximum capacity of the operator, performance degrades. Only at 
medium levels of demand are resources (and hence performance) optimized.  These ideas 
are best understood in figures 2 and 3 [figure numbering from original paper]. 
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Figure 2: Relation between task demands and performance under a fixed 
capacity model (adapted from Stokes et al., 1990).  Upper limit of attentional 
capacity is fixed (dashed line), and as task demands (solid line) approach that 
limit, performance (dotted line) degrades. 
 
Figure 2 represents the textbook approach, in which performance remains constant until 
task demands begin to exceed capacity, reflecting the invariance of the capacity upper 
limit.  However, in figure 3, the theory of malleable attentional resources has been 
applied to depress the upper capacity limit at lower task demands.  This also limits the 
performance ceiling, effectively creating the classic inverted-U relation between task 
demands and performance. 
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Figure 3: Relation between task demands and performance under a malleable 
attentional resources model. 
 
Adopting a malleable attentional resources position would, therefore, help to explain the 
results from a number of studies in which performance and MWL are positively 
correlated (e.g. Roscoe 1992, Thornton et al. 1992, Scallen et al. 1995, Moss and Triggs 
1997). Indeed, even basic memory research reviewed by Baddeley (1986) could be 
interpreted as support for MART. A positive correlation between memory span and 
concurrent reasoning was explained in terms of the demanding influence of error-
correction, but the results are also consistent with a change in resource capacity. 
 
On the basis of MART, it is predicted that excessively low mental workload, such as may 
be presented by automation, could result in a reduction of attentional resources. Young 
and Stanton (2002) used a neat measure of resource capacity to demonstrate that this was 
indeed the case. By comparing eye movements to responses to a secondary task, it was 
found that attentional capacity directly correlated with MWL. This was the first 
investigation into MART, and provided enough proof to warrant further investigations. 
 
DON NORMAN:  Underload: what a fascinating concept!  I had not considered it 
before, but your analysis in the Human Factors paper is tantalizing.  Now, couple that 
with Malleable Attentional Resources.  I need time to digest this paper, as well as to read 
some of the papers you cite, and of course, the ones you are sending. 
  
I obviously have some questions. For example, how well would your subjects respond to 
an unexpected emergency in the driving task (say, the need for sudden braking).  
 If resources are truly diminished, then the braking response would be inferior for the 
situation with less attentional load.  This would be a counter-intuitive result, which would 
greatly strengthen your hypothesis. 
  
In this task, speed control was dramatically simplified for the manual condition because it 
is far easier to follow a car at a constant speed than to do so without the following 
behavior.  Thus, it is possible that as far as speed control was concerned, manual and 
ACC were similar. 
  
I haven't fully digested the implications of your attentional ratio measure.  This seems to 
be hits divided by possible response time.  Figure 1 shows hits increasing with the 4 
conditions. Figure 2 [figure numbering from original paper] shows the ratio decreasing.  
So presumably time dramatically increases across the four conditions (well, I guess not 
much difference between manual and ACC).  What does the ratio really mean, however? 
 
‘Figure 2’: Attention ratio scores across each automation condition 
 
 
 Anyway, I'm still thinking about this.  But I believe underload to be a very important 
concept. MART probably is as well, but that requires more thought on my part – but it 
has passed the first test.  I think this is fascinating work with some fascinating 
implications.  I await the other papers. 
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 The attention ratio was used to measure spare capacity, as it was expected that more time 
would allow more responses to the secondary task.  We believe it essentially measures 
the effectiveness of a person's responses given the amount of time they're spending on it.  
For the sake of argument, let's say someone spending a minute on a task makes 60 correct 
responses.  We could reasonably assume, then, that if they spent two minutes on the same 
task, they'd make 120 responses.  However, in our underload conditions, that person 
might only be making, say, 80 or 100 responses.  So although the driving task is easier, 
allowing them to spend more time on the secondary task, their responses aren't going up 
in proportion - and, indeed, are significantly fewer than they should be.  It seems then, 
that proportionally fewer responses are accompanied with increasing levels of 
automation, which suggests to us that the attentional resource pool is somewhat 
diminished.   
 
We have tried hard to rule out competing explanations (out-of-the-loop performance, as 
you note, as well as vigilance, mobilisation of effort, and trust in automation).  The 
clincher comes, as you've foreseen, in an emergency scenario - I think that the emergency 
braking data would support the tenets of MART.  We have done some exploratory studies 
of this sort and found that automation does not prepare the driver for emergencies; they 
do not use the spare capacity to engage in additional hazard detection and emergency 
response preparation activities.  Quite the reverse appears to happen. 
 
As predicted, participants in the underload conditions do not react as well as those who've 
been under higher workload.  Interestingly, though, it's only the less skilled drivers who 
suffer, which I think is a result of automaticity, and actually supports MART even 
further.  It's been said that emergency braking is an automatic response for skilled 
drivers, bypassing attentional resources - so although everyone suffers diminished 
attention, it doesn't matter so much for the experts.  This has a whole bunch of interesting 
implications for automation design and driver training. 
 
  
EXTRACT FROM:  Young, M. S. & Stanton, N. A. (2002). Malleable Attentional 
Resources Theory: A new explanation for the effects of mental underload on 
performance.  Human Factors, 44 (3), 365-375. 
 
The attention ratio score is possibly the single most important result to emerge from this 
experiment, and it provides the first piece of evidence in favor of malleable attentional 
resources theory. That participants’ responses on the secondary task did not vary 
consistently with the amount of attention they directed to the task suggests that the size of 
the resource pool can change. On the basis of the malleable attentional resources 
hypothesis, it was expected that the attention ratio score would decrease in line with the 
MWL data from the secondary task.  This prediction was directly upheld by the observed 
data, providing strong evidence for an association between task demands and attentional 
resource capacity. 
 
These are encouraging results for MART.  Further support is provided by the primary 
task performance data, as these reductions in demand are not accompanied by changes in 
driving performance. It could be argued that these results are attributable to different 
attention allocation strategies, or to a qualitative change in the driving task (from active 
operator to passive monitor), allowing more time to be devoted to the secondary task in 
the light of a perceived reduction in driving demands. If participants’ allocation policies 
were inappropriate to the relative task demands, though, either a decrement in driving 
performance or an improvement in secondary task performance should be observed.  This 
 was not the case, driving performance remained constant regardless of attention ratio 
score, and no improvement in secondary task error rate was observed. Therefore, all 
attention devoted to the secondary task really did represent spare capacity. Furthermore, 
that driving performance did not improve with reductions in task demands implies that all 
spare capacity was allocated to the secondary task.  It is reasonably safe to assume, then, 
that the sum of primary and secondary task demands reflected the total attentional 
capacity of the driver.  Given this assumption, and the fact that increases in secondary 
task scores were not proportional to increases in visual attention, it is logical to conclude 
that attentional capacity had shrunk. 
 
An alternative perspective might appeal to the classic vigilance decrement (e.g., 
Mackworth, 1948; Singleton, 1989) as an explanation for the results obtained here. 
However, the present experimental design does not qualify it as a vigilance task.  
Observations elsewhere (Singleton, 1989; Warm, Dember, & Hancock, 1996) have 
typically found that a vigilance decrement sets in after 20 to 30 min. Given the 10-min 
trials in the current study, it is unlikely that vigilance would have caused a problem.  
Furthermore, Parasuraman (1987) argued that continuous, dynamic tasks do not lend 
themselves to vigilance problems, and it is easily arguable that the task of driving fits 
these criteria.  Therefore, malleable attentional resources theory seems to be a more likely 
explanation for these data. 
 
Other alternatives relate to the nature of the task and center on issues of motivation and 
arousal. One might suggest that participants were simply bored or less motivated to 
maintain performance on the secondary task in the underload conditions. If this were the 
case, it would be expected that a lack of motivation would have a general effect on 
performance. Because performance on the primary (driving) task was not affected, the 
balance of evidence favors MART.  Similarly, although physiological arousal was not 
measured in the present study, all of the experimental conditions posed fairly equal levels 
of physical demand.  There was no reason to believe a priori that physiological arousal 
would vary, and the counterbalanced conditions should have mitigated any confounding 
effects of motivation or arousal. However, it is acknowledged that mental demands might 
have influenced attentional capacity only via an effect on arousal.  Future research could 
strengthen the argument for MART by including measures of motivation and arousal. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the possible influence of arousal actually gives MART 
more support from the established literature. Kahneman’s (1973) original model of 
attention explicitly identified physiological arousal as a factor in attentional capacity. If 
future investigations into MART cannot dissociate mental demands from arousal in 
determining resource size, then the contribution of this research will be limited to 
resurrecting ideas that have since been glossed over in the applied literature. In our 
opinion, such a contribution is no less valuable than validating the new theory itself. 
Indeed, there are practical advantages in the link with arousal because it is more readily 
detected than mental underload and may help with the design of monitoring systems. 
 
In terms of the design implications, then, one might controversially conclude that drivers 
should be given extra tasks in their automated cars in order to maintain capacity at 
optimal levels. This denies all best practice in human factors, which prescribes a holistic 
approach to designing systems around the driver. Most ergonomists now agree that 
systems should be designed to support the driver rather than to replace them (Alm, 
Svidén, & Waern, 1997; Grote, Weik, Wafler, & Zolch, 1995; Stanton & Young, 1998). 
The technology behind ACC could feasibly be used to present distance and/or relative 
speed information to the driver, rather than to actively control the vehicle itself. This 
 solution would also satisfy the driver’s need for feedback, a classic problem with 
automated systems (Norman, 1990). 
 
 
DON NORMAN:  All the people in the auto companies that I talk with defend the use of 
automation because it will "relax" the driver.  Hmm.  Your analysis is that it is not wise 
to relax the driver. 
  
What I like about your approach is that it distinguishes underload from being "out of the 
loop": two very different concepts. 
  
So, from your theoretical work, we should be able to compute an ideal state of attentional 
resource allocation -- or if you will, an ideal cognitive workload.  Too small is bad.  Too 
high is bad. Where is optimal? 
 
NEVILLE STANTON AND MARK YOUNG:  You are correct of course Don, we 
want an attentive driver rather than a relaxed one.  We think that it should be possible to 
plot attention-workload-performance curves, but (as with all psychological phenomena) 
there will be big individual differences. 
 
The theoretical implications do predict an inverse-U relation between workload and 
performance, as has long been suspected (see our TIES paper).  However, the maximum 
of the curve is never going to be the same for everyone, nor under different situations.  So 
we still have a fair way to go on defining the 'redline' of underload! 
 
There seems to be little evidence that insights such as these have been incorporated into 
current (and, so far as we can tell, future) vehicle technologies.  We have postulated that 
the driver could well find him or herself fighting with these systems, which would be 
reminiscent of the 'problem' with automation described in your paper.  In it, you describe 
it as “not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design.  The problem is 
that the operations under normal operating conditions are performed appropriately, but 
there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the 
overall conduct of the task.  When the situations exceed the capabilities of the automatic 
equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers.” 
(Norman, 1990, p. 585).  Although the paper gives several examples from the aviation 
industry, it appears to us that the words ‘human’ and ‘task’ in the quote above could 
easily be replaced with ‘driver’ and ‘driving’. 
 
EXTRACT FROM:  Norman, D.A.  1990,  The ‘ problem’ with automation:  
inappropriate feedback and interaction, not ‘over-automation’.  Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 
Lond. B. 327,  585-593. 
 
 
a. We do not know enough to mimic natural human interaction 
Note that the problems in all three of the [aviation] case studies were not due to a lack of 
information, at least not in the technical sense.  Autopilots work by physically moving the 
same controls that the pilots use.  In the case studies of the loss of engine power and the 
fuel leak, the autopilots compensated by turning the control wheels.  In theory, the crew 
could have noted the problem quite early by noting the position of the wheels, just as the 
second officer did note an abnormality in the fuel gauge readings in the fuel leak case 
study.  Similarly, there was sufficient information in the case of pilot incapacitation.  In 
these cases the problem was that no person or system commented upon the issues, so that 
 nothing brought the potential problem to the attention of the relevant people. The 
feedback was potentially available, but it was not attended to properly. (During the 
writing of this paper, I took part in an informal replication of the fuel leak incident in the 
NASA-Ames full-vision, full-motion 727 simulator. Once again, the second officer failed 
to note the discrepant control wheel position, even though in this case he had read the 
relevant accident report: the normal cockpit activities drew the focus of attention away 
from the control wheel position.  Our analyses afterwards indicated that the wheel 
position was not a very salient clue in any case.  We plan further studies including a 
careful replication of this situation as well as a formal experimental study of the two 
'thought experiments' described in this paper.)  The task of presenting feedback in an 
appropriate way is not easy to do.  Indeed, we do not yet know how to do it.  We do have 
a good example of how not to inform people of possible difficulties: overuse of alarms.  
One of the problems of modern automation is the unintelligent use of alarms, each 
individual instrument having a single threshold condition that it uses to sound a buzzer or 
flash a message to the operator, warning of problems.  The proliferation of these alarms 
and the general unreliability of these single-threshold events causes much difficulty (see 
Patterson 1989, Sorkin 1989, and Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz 1988).  What is 
needed is continual feedback about the state of the system, in a normal natural way, much 
in the manner that human participants in a joint problem-solving activity will discuss the 
issues among themselves.  This means designing systems that are informative, yet non-
intrusive, so the interactions are done normally and continually, where the amount and 
form of feedback adapts to the interactive style of the participants and the nature of the 
problem.  We do not yet know how to do this with automatic devices: current attempts 
tend to irritate as much as they inform, either failing to present enough information or 
presenting so much that it becomes an irritant: a nagging, 'back-seat driver', second-
guessing all actions. 
 
b. A higher order of awareness is needed 
To give the appropriate kind of feedback requires a higher level of sophistication in 
automation than currently exists.  Consider what is required for an automatic pilot to note 
that it is compensating more than normal. The current automatic systems are feedback 
loops that attempt to maintain a constant system state.  To provide self-monitoring 
capability that would let it recognize that conditions are changing and more and more 
compensation is being used, would require a kind of higher-level of awareness, a 
monitoring of its own monitoring abilities.  Now, obviously, it would not be difficult to 
build automatic systems for the specific cases of monitoring for increased rudder or 
control-yoke compensation, or for inappropriate fuel loss: any competent computer-
scientist could write an appropriate program. But what about the next problem, one that 
will involve yet a different system, yet a slightly different anomaly?  We do not know 
how to solve the general condition.  Consider what would be required of a fuel 
monitoring system to detect that the fuel level of tank x was dropping, but that fuel was 
only supposed to be fed from tank y.  To solve this problem, in the general case, requires 
an intelligent system, one that understands the implications of the various control settings 
of the system.  There probably has to be a knowledge base of the systems in the aircraft 
plus an internal representation for the items that would allow the system to reason about 
the potential cases.  This is the sort of thing done today in laboratories of artificial 
intelligence and cognitive science, but we do not know how to solve this problem, for the 
general case.  Moreover, even if the automatic monitoring equipment were to note the 
existence of a system trend or discrepancy that could lead to a difficulty later on, how 
should it be brought to the attention of the operators in a natural, intelligent fashion, 
much the way that normal cockpit conversation works?  The solutions will require higher 
levels of automation, some forms of intelligence in the controls, an appreciation for the 
 proper form of human communication that keeps people well informed, on top of the 
issues, but not annoyed and irritated.  Our current level of knowledge is not enough to do 
these things. 
 
c. The new irony of over-automation 
Many ills have been laid at the feet of 'over-automation'. Too much automation takes the 
human out of the control loop, it deskills them, and it lowers morale. One much 
remarked-upon irony of automation is that it fails when it is most needed. I agree with all 
the analyses of the problems, but from these analyses, I reach the opposite conclusion, a 
different irony: our current problems with automation, problems that tend to be blamed 
on 'over-automation', are probably the result of just the opposite problem—the problem is 
not that the automation is too powerful, the problem is that it is not powerful enough. 
 
d. Why don't current systems provide feedback? 
Why do current systems have such poor feedback and interaction?  In part, the reason is a 
lack of sensitivity on the part of the designer, but in part, it is for a perfectly natural 
reason: the automation itself doesn't need it!  That is, if a designer is asked to design an 
automatic piece of equipment to control some function, the task is completed when the 
device functions as requested. Providing feedback and monitoring information to the 
human operators is of secondary importance, primarily because there does not appear to 
be any need for it.  Feedback is essential because equipment does fail and because 
unexpected events do arise. In fact, in any complex task or environment, one should 
always expect unexpected events: what is unexpected is the type of event that will occur. 
 
Human operators need to cope with these situations, and this is why the feedback and 
'conversation' is required. Were the equipment never to fail, were it capable of handling 
all possible situations, then the human operator would not be necessary, so the feedback 
and interaction would similarly not be necessary. Today, in the absence of perfect 
automation an appropriate design should assume the existence of error, it should 
continually provide feedback, it should continually interact with operators in an 
appropriate manner, and it should have a design appropriate for the worst of situations.  
What is needed is a soft, compliant technology, not a rigid, formal one. 
 
DON NORMAN:  Just a short note to say how much I am enjoying reading your papers.  
I think you have done a really excellent job of bringing together all of the issues.  But is 
anyone in the product side of automobiles listening? 
 
I particularly liked your review paper.  I realize this is five years old and that you have 
gone beyond this in your more recent work. Still, it's a great review and includes many 
other critical factors (e.g., trust). 
 
But you have done a magnificent job of giving me material to ponder.  So thank you. 
 
NEVILLE STANTON AND MARK YOUNG:  It is good to hear that you are enjoying 
our work, praise indeed!  We have worked with vehicle manufacturers in the past, but 
mainly chasing technology rather than anticipating it.  We were involved in an ACC 
project in the late 1990s and managed to get some recommendations incorporated into the 
first generation systems. 
 
EXTRACT FROM:  Stanton, N. A., & Young, M. S. (2000). A proposed 
psychological model of driving automation. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomic 
Science, 1(4), 315-331.  
  
Whether we like it or not, automation is gradually taking over the driver’s role.  Full 
vehicle automation is predicted to be on British roads by 2030 (Walker, Stanton and 
Young, 2000).  Whilst it is accepted that some drivers will still want to control their 
vehicles manually, many may be pleased to relinquish the role to automatic systems.  
Many of the computing technologies have been grounded in aviation systems (Billings, 
1997; Stanton and Marsden, 1996), and technologies like adaptive cruise control are 
taking over from the driver already (Richardson, Barber, King, Hoare and Cooper, 1997). 
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) heralds a new generation of vehicle (Stanton, Young & 
McCaulder, 1997).  ACC controls both speed and headway of the vehicle, braking with 
limited authority in the presence of a slower lead vehicle, and returning to the set speed 
when the lead vehicle disappears (Richardson, Barber, King, Hoare and Cooper, 1997).  
In this way ACC differs from traditional Cruise Control (CC) systems.  In traditional 
cruise control, the system relieves the driver of foot control of the accelerator only (i.e., 
relieving the driver of some physical workload), whereas ACC relieves the driver of 
some of the decision making elements of the task, such as deciding to brake or change 
lanes (i.e., relieving the driver of some mental workload), as well as physical demands of 
accelerator control.  Potentially, then, ACC is a welcome additional vehicle system that 
will add comfort and convenience to the driver (Richardson et al., 1997).  However, 
certain psychological issues do arise when considering any form of automation and these 
need to be properly addressed to improve overall system performance.  It is envisaged 
that although the ACC system will behave in exactly the manner prescribed by the 
designers and programmers, this may lead to some scenarios in which the driver’s 
perception of the situation is at odds with the system operation (Stanton and Young, 
1998).  Indeed, even those developing the systems recognise that “headway control raises 
the issue of whether the system matches the driver expectations with regard to braking 
and headway control” (Richardson et al., 1997; p. 91). 
 
Most of the literature on driver behaviour tends to be restricted to the examination of a 
very limited set of variables.  Whilst it might be argued by the researchers that this focus 
is necessary in order to determine the importance of the interaction between two or three 
important variables, it does not constitute the complexity of interplay between variables 
in the world at large.  Sophisticated experimental design and analysis methodologies are 
able to cope with this complexity however, to provide an understanding of multiple 
interacting variables necessary to develop a psychological model of driving with 
automation.  The purpose of this paper is, then, to identify the relevant the psychological 
variables and, on the basis of the literature, propose a psychological model.  
 
An in-depth analysis of the psychological factors associated with the operation of 
automated systems is required to enable recommendations to be developed.  The 
pertinent factors were elicited from a systems model of the driver-automation-vehicle as 
shown in figure 1, discussed by Stanton and Marsden (1996).  From this figure, some 
potential psychological constructs emerge (see figure 2).   
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Figure 1.  Information flow between driver, automatics and vehicle sub-systems (from 
Stanton and Marsden, 1996). 
 
 
Stress
Task  
demands
Feedback Mental  workload
Situation  
awareness
Locus of  
control Trust
Mental  
model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Hypothesised relationship between psychological factors 
 
Most obvious is the issue of feedback, as can be seen as the information flows around the 
subsystems.  Of particular interest is the role of feedback to the driver from the automated 
 system.  Typically, this tends to be poor (e.g., the lack of feedback from automated 
systems in the domain of aviation has been implicated in some incidents, Norman, 1990), 
because the automated systems do not require the feedback to function.  Relatedly, the 
development of the driver's trust in the automated system may depend upon appropriate 
feedback.  According to Muir and Moray (1996), the amount of feedback sought from an 
automated system by a human operator is directly related to the degree of trust they have 
in it to perform without failure.  Passing control of the vehicle to a computer raises the 
issue of locus-of-control in the driver: does the driver feel that they, or the computer, is 
ultimately in control of the automobile?  The degree to which a symbiotic relationship 
exists between the driver and the automatic system could determine how successful 
vehicle automation is perceived.  One of the claims of all forms of automation is that the 
demands placed upon human operators will be reduced (Bainbridge, 1983).  Therefore, 
the effects upon mental workload need to be considered.  The workload literature 
suggests that there is an optimum level that leads to enhanced performance, demands 
greatly above or below this level could have a negative effect the driver (Young & 
Stanton, 1997), such as increased levels of stress.  Matthews and Desmond (1996) have 
found that driver stress is an important factor in the drivers like, or dislike, of driving and 
is linked to their experience of mental workload.  One of the central concepts in driver 
automation seems to be the extent to which the driver is aware of the state of the 
automatic system, and the impact that has on the vehicle trajectory through the world.  
This concept is called situational awareness and has been the subject of research in the 
field of aviation (Endsley, 1995).  Situational awareness depends, to a great extent, upon 
the development of an accurate model of the world, that enables information to be 
interpreted and predictions of future states made.  Therefore, the role of mental models 
will also be considered.  All of these factors are well established in the psychological 
literature but have yet to be fully explored with respect to vehicle automation. 
 
DON NORMAN: Thanks, Neville, for the paper on ACC.  The following incident was 
told to me recently by a friend (Jim Hollan of UCSD).  What to you make of it? 
 
Driving on the highway with ACC.   Lots of traffic, so the vehicle is travelling slowly. 
The car now reaches its exit point, so the driver turns off the highway on to the exit lane. 
But the driver had forgotten that he was in ACC mode.  The ACC, noting the absence of 
vehicles in front, rapidly accelerated to highway speeds, which is quite dangerous on the 
exit lane.  The driver braked in time, slowing the car and disengaging ACC. 
 
This is a classical example of mode error.  As far as I can tell, you have not addressed 
issues of this sort.   What do you think? 
 
NEVILLE STANTON, GUY WALKER AND MARK YOUNG:  It strikes us that 
these incidents (including that of your friend) are rather like the mode errors seen in other 
transport domains.  For example, the two state warning device fitted into train cabs that 
alerts driver’s to upcoming events (like signals or speed restrictions); the driver ‘losing 
track’ of what the warning refers to has been cited in several major accidents and 
incidents.  Likewise, in the aviation sector, there are numerous instances of the autopilot 
being inadvertently and unknowingly configured for one course of action when another 
was desired.  The key issue seems to be an uncoupling of system state from the user’s 
perception of the system state.  This is a fascinating, yet serious issue.  In our technology 
trends paper we have tried to imagine both positive and negative consequences of vehicle 
automation and technology. 
 
 
 EXTRACT FROM: Walker, G. H., Stanton, N.A., and Young, M.S. (2001). Where is 
computing driving cars? A technology trajectory of vehicle design. International 
Journal of Human Computer Interaction, 13, (2), 203-229. 
 
It can be anticipated from the data gathered for this survey that embedded computing and 
mechanical intervention will have reached new heights by 2015.  The vehicle will 
become a fully integrated unit with all its primary mechanical systems electronically 
linked, communicating with each other to accurately adapt to the driver and the road 
circumstances.  In doing this, safety, efficiency and enjoyment can be maximised.  Two 
thought experiments permit speculation on what the driving experience is likely to 
change into within the next 15 years, from two alternative view-points.  Firstly, an 
optimistic forecast, contrasted with a pessimistic forecast. 
 
Thought Experiment 1 – An Optimistic 2015 Test Drive 
Pulling out of the driveway, the handling management system rapidly detects, via G-
sensors and inputs from the active yaw system that the vehicle is travelling on 
challenging twisting roads.  Algorithms, or even neural networks within the engine 
management and active yaw control systems deduce that the driver is also adopting a 
more sporting driving style. These systems will then signal to the steer by wire and the 
active damping system to endow the chassis with greater, more responsive ‘turn-in’ 
characteristics, at the expense of straight line stability, in order to help and encourage the 
driver to use the vehicle’s considerable reserves of grip and roadholding.  At the same 
time the engine management will revert to performance orientated ignition and valve 
timing maps and the soft instrument cluster will give extra dominance to the rev counter, 
and other engine parameters such as oil pressure and temperature, that are relevant to the 
type of driving currently in progress.  This all combines to provide the sort of feedback 
and driver enjoyment that befits a sporty orientated car.  In addition, the handling and 
engine management software has been tailored to the sales market that this particular car 
was sold into. Furthermore, at the heart of the software running on the vehicle’s 
embedded computing are the vehicle parameters and characteristics that endow it with 
it’s own distinctive, unmistakable ‘brand character’.   
 
Upon joining the motorway, however, the ACC will automatically activate, as will the 
traffic information and GPS navigation system.  These help the driver select routes that 
maximise the efficiency with which the road network can be used.  Behind the scenes, the 
engine management will revert to ignition and valve timing maps that optimise fuel 
efficiency and the soft instrument cluster will give prominence to the speedometer.  
Recognizing that sporty levels of feedback can be tiresome and, therefore, inappropriate 
for motorway cruising, the steer by wire and active damping will adjust the chassis for 
comfort and straight line stability.   
 
The driver eventually joins a platoon of vehicles in the outside lane of the motorway, 
with all the vehicles in the convoy sensing each other via radar.  The driver just has to 
steer the vehicle and good progress is being made, with minimal physical effort.  
However, an older car in the middle lane has not noticed the vehicle in front of it slowing 
and cuts sharply into the path of our car.   
 
The car’s 360 degree sensors detect an imminent collision. Almost instantaneously the 
drive by wire sensors detect that the driver is not using the vehicle’s abilities to the full, 
so the vehicle steps in to help by initiating the ABS and cutting the vehicle’s audio and 
communication system to reduce any superfluous distractions.  The car’s systems detect 
that the driver is now responding with collision avoidance manoeuvres.  The active yaw 
 control comes into action to encourage the driver to initiate a manoeuvre at the edge of 
the vehicle’s performance envelope.  All the time information is flowing between vehicle 
systems throughout the car, via the OSEK architecture.  The active yaw control and ABS 
are talking to the engine management so that the driven wheels are helping in collision 
avoidance.  The smart airbags already know that there are two occupants on board, an 
individual in the driver’s seat who weighs 90Kg and a passenger in the front seat 
weighing 60Kg and if required would deploy accordingly as would seat belt pre-
tensioners via powerful 42volt actuators. Fortunately, the collision avoidance system, by 
helping the driver to fully exploit the vehicle’s capabilities, has enabled the potential 
collision to be avoided.  The driver can recommence driving and complete their journey 
unscathed.  
 
Thought Experiment 2 – A Pessimistic 2015 Test Drive 
Pulling out of the driveway the driver accelerates hard whilst piloting the car along 
twisting country lanes.  The car is certainly going where the driver is intending it to, but 
the feedback is a little confusing for the driver.  Even normal drivers are very sensitive to 
vehicle handling characteristics (Hoffman & Joubert, 1968) and thus the whole driving 
experience feels rather sterile, as though the controls are remote from the devices actually 
under control.  Also, the dashboard persists in altering its appearance and layout, which 
the driver finds distracting. 
 
Accelerating onto the motorway the autonomous ACC system automatically activates 
when the driver would prefer to remain in manual control for a while as they settle down 
to a desirable cruise speed.  The navigation system attempts to be helpful, but the driver 
knows exactly where they want to go.  Unfortunately, the voice recognition system is not 
responding very well and the driver has difficulty in telling the device to shut down.  
More out of frustration than a desire to make progress, the driver sets the cruise speed to 
100mph and sets about picking their way through slower traffic.  There is no longer much 
need to use the vehicle’s mirrors prior to indicating as collision sensors warn the driver if 
there is a car alongside using a virtual rumble strip that shakes the steering wheel. 
 
Five miles down the road the driver joins a platoon of ACC equipped cars cruising in 
convoy in the outside lane of the motorway.  The lead car has set their cruise speed to 
around 90mph, which in terms of target risk is about the level at which most drivers seem 
willing to exceed the 70mph limit by.  Car drivers have, therefore, adapted the 
technology to their needs and preferences in an unanticipated manner; one in which the 
Traffic Police strictly forbid, though struggle to enforce.  It is also implicitly assumed by 
other drivers that the lead vehicle is anticipating the road conditions further ahead on 
their behalf and the following drivers, apart from steering the vehicle, tend to disengage 
somewhat with the driving task.  Besides, in-vehicle devices such as MP3 players and in-
car internet provide plenty of other things to do during cruising.    
 
However, while passing a string of older cars in the middle lane the driver notices that 
brake lights are coming on, and suddenly a vehicle swerves across immediately in front 
of our vehicle.  At the instant before the driver was about to accelerate and steer into a 
small vacant gap in the middle lane, in order to allow the older vehicle to miss the front 
of our car, the ABS cuts in violently.  The collision avoidance system, of course, can’t 
see brake lights, neither can it see small adjacent gaps that the driver wishes to use as a 
form of ‘escape route’.  It just knows that a proximity/speed threshold has been exceeded 
and that the maximum occupant protection is afforded in the longitudinal plane.  Whilst 
sustaining an unexpected 1.2g of deceleration the driver still tries to steer left to allow the 
skidding car to pass in front, but the collision avoidance system has other ideas.  It tries to 
 maintain the car in a straight ahead position, whilst still braking hard.  The steer-by-wire 
technology is, under these circumstances, given full authority to override driver inputs.  
The driver and passenger are suddenly recoiled back in their seats as the seat belt pre 
tensioners activate, the drivers view is then totally obscured as the airbags deploy and a 
violent collision occurs at the front of the vehicle.  Both occupants are shaken but 
otherwise completely unharmed; secondary (in not primary) safety is now far advanced.  
Unfortunately, the other older vehicle and its occupants have not survived the collision 
with the newer car very well at all.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Thought experiment 1 demonstrates how technology and embedded computing optimises 
the interaction that the vehicle has with the road, and how it can potentially enhance the 
interaction between the vehicle and the driver.  The assumption in this case is that the 
implementation of vehicle technology has benefited from human factors research to 
mitigate the effects of negative behaviour adaptation due to RHT, misuse of the 
technology by the driver and inappropriate feedback.  Conversely, thought experiment 2 
demonstrates an alternative scenario where the vehicle and its associated technology is 
not interacting optimally with the psychology of the driver, leading ultimately to 
frustration and misuse.  Relevant to both scenarios is the issue of partial integration, 
whereby the newer, technology laden vehicle, is sharing the road with older, less 
sophisticated vehicles with a range of consequences, especially for safety and efficiency.    
 
All vehicle technologies have consequences not only for the interaction that the vehicle 
has with the road, and other vehicles, but also for the interaction between the driver, their 
vehicle, and the in-vehicle technology.  This paper echoes the message of others in the 
field of advanced vehicle technology, in stating that a wide range of important human 
factors issues surround the implementation and use of such technology (Michon, 1993; 
Owens, Helmers, & Sivak, 1993;  Parkes & Franzen, 1993). Research concerning human 
machine interaction is a growing area that has wrought measurable improvements, but in 
comparison to the vehicles interaction with the road (an area that is well understood and 
rapidly becoming optimised) there is still much that remains to be learnt.   
 
It is fortunate that, to-date, vehicles have evolved relatively well to the needs and abilities 
of drivers.  It is certainly difficult to conceive of a similar device of such mechanical 
complexity and an environment of usage with similar dynamism and potential danger, 
being interacted with so effectively and by such a diverse population of users.  The pace 
of technological change, however, does not afford a similar luxury in terms of a further 
100 years of evolution towards the solutions of integrating advanced driver technology 
with the capabilities and limitations of drivers.  Human Factors provides a means, if you 
will, of ‘short circuiting’ the evolutionary envelope; a means to scientifically understand 
and to predict the ways in which driver behaviour will adapt and, one hopes, be improved 
by new technology.  More importantly, an opportunity arises to use Human Factors much 
earlier on in the design process to derive truly innovative technological solutions to 
improving safety, efficiency and enjoyment.   
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